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Laurel A. Rigertas 
How Do You Rate Your Lawyer?  Lawyers’ Responses to 
Online Reviews of Their Services 
Abstract.  With the proliferation of opportunities for consumers to review 
a variety of services on the Internet, it is only a matter of time until more 
clients review their attorneys’ services on the Internet.  This raises a variety of 
potential ethical and public policy issues.  First, what can attorneys do to try 
to control their online reputations?  Second, if a client posts negative 
comments about an attorney’s services on a public Internet forum, can the 
attorney respond on that forum without breaching the duty of confidentiality 
and, if so, how?  Finally, when settling a dispute with a client, may an attorney 
put a provision in a settlement agreement that prohibits a client from posting 
any reviews of the lawyer’s services on the Internet?  This Article will address 
each of these questions in light of normative considerations, the rules 
governing lawyers’ conduct, clients’ interest in confidentiality and loyalty, 
lawyers’ reputational interests, and public policy concerns about consumers’ 
access to accurate information about legal services. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the proliferation of opportunities for consumers to review a variety 
of services on the Internet, clients are increasingly reviewing their 
attorneys’ services on various online sites.  The best ways for lawyers to 
minimize negative online reviews are to: (1) be careful to screen potential 
clients who may have unrealistic expectations, (2) to maintain good 
communication with clients, and (3) try to resolve any conflicts with 
clients early and amicably.  However, prevention will not result in a 100% 
satisfaction rate and, at some point, most lawyers will probably be the 
subject of one or more negative online reviews that could affect their 
reputation.  The reputation of lawyers is not only important to any 
individual lawyer, but it is also important to the profession as a whole. 
As lawyers seek to defend their reputations, some of the possible means 
of controlling negative reviews raise potential ethical and public policy 
issues that will be discussed in this Article.  Part I will briefly outline the 
various interests at stake when consumers review, or are restrained from 
reviewing, legal services.  Part II will look at some efforts by doctors to 
prevent negative reviews by limiting their patients’ conduct through 
contract law at the outset of the physician–patient relationship.  This 
section will assess whether those efforts could be emulated by lawyers 
during the creation of the lawyer–client relationship, particularly in light of 
the unique ethical constrains on lawyers.  Part III will assess options 
available to a lawyer if a client or former client posts negative comments 
about an attorney’s services on a public online forum.  Specifically, this 
section will address whether the attorney can post a public response to the 
negative review without breaching the duty of confidentiality and, if so, 
how.  This section will also look briefly at defamation suits as a possible 
remedy.  Finally, Part IV will examine whether, when settling a dispute 
with a client, an attorney can put a provision in a settlement agreement 
that prohibits a client from making any public statements or reviews about 
the lawyer’s services. 
I.     THE INTERESTS AT STAKE 
This Article examines the review of lawyers’ services primarily from the 
perspective of lawyers who may be motivated to act in order to protect 
their professional reputations.  However, the appropriateness of lawyers’ 
actions in this regard cannot be assessed without considering the variety of 
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interests at stake and how those interests should inform the decision-
making of both lawyers who act to protect their online professional 
reputations and courts who then have to rule on the measures.  Other 
interests that are relevant include the clients’ interests in both 
confidentiality and in voicing their opinions about legal services they have 
received, consumers’ interest in learning about lawyers who they are 
thinking about hiring, and the legal profession’s interest in both its 
collective reputation and in providing information to the public in a 
manner that will help increase its ability to access suitable legal services. 
Clients have an interest in the ability to share information with others 
about their experiences with their lawyers.  Whether happy or dissatisfied, 
the ability to voice one’s opinion about the quality of services is important 
to consumers as evidenced by the explosion of online reviews.  Clients of 
legal services, however, also have a stake in having their lawyers maintain 
the confidentiality of the information learned during the course of legal 
representation.  This raises issues unique to lawyers and physicians—unlike 
other service providers, their ability to respond to online criticism is 
constrained by confidentiality and privacy obligations. 
The public has an interest in learning information about lawyers whom 
they are considering hiring.  In the absence of a word of mouth referral, it 
is quite difficult for the general public to learn information about lawyers 
whom they may want to hire, such as their ability to demonstrate 
responsiveness, empathy, competence, etc.  “Traditionally, law firms and 
what their client interactions are like have been cloaked in mystery, and 
nobody really knows how good their service is . . . .  That’s obviously 
disadvantageous to clients.”1  But an increase in access to information 
online may help empower clients to feel more in control of their decisions, 
such as when they need a lawyer and who they will hire.2  Such 
information, however, is not useful to consumers if it is false.3 
 
1. Stephanie Francis Ward, Grade Anxiety, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2010, at 48, 53; see Tobias J. Butler, 
The Realities of Relying on Doctor-Patient Non-Disclosure Agreements for Reputational Protection, 
HEALTH LAW., June 2010, at 23, 23 (outlining similar concerns in the area of consumers finding 
information about health care providers). 
2. See, e.g., Steve Seidenberg, Firm Opinions, A.B.A. J. E-Report, May 2005, at 6  (discussing 
how client recommendations have changed due to the Internet).  See generally Ann Marie Marciarille, 
“How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 361, 365–67 (2012) (addressing similarities raised by the simultaneous “democratization of 
medical knowledge” and rise in patients seeking more information about medical professionals). 
3. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Grade Anxiety, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2010, at 48, 53 (balancing the 
value of credible online ratings of lawyers and the dangers of ones that are subject to manipulation); 
see also Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing Physician 
Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 393–94 (2012) (noting that, with respect to 
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The legal profession has an interest in its reputation as a whole because 
its legitimacy and its status as a self-regulated profession rely heavily on the 
reputation and integrity of the profession.4  Disparaging remarks about 
lawyers could undermine the profession’s reputation and, if the remarks 
are unfounded, could create false perceptions among the public.  However, 
the profession as a whole also has an interest in assisting the public in 
obtaining meaningful information about lawyers who they want to hire.  
Consumer reviews of services are of increasing importance to consumer 
purchasing decisions and the legal profession should be mindful of 
unnecessarily impeding this trend.5  Lastly, online reviews of lawyers’ 
services may aid the regulators of the legal profession in becoming aware of 
possible misconduct by individual lawyers as well as trends in clients’ 
perception of lawyers’ services that could inform the training of lawyers 
and/or drafting of disciplinary rules. 
II.     PROTECTING REPUTATIONAL INTERESTS AT THE FORMATION OF THE 
ATTORNEY–CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
Attorneys interested in controlling their online reputations may consider 
trying to control their clients’ online activities as part of the contractual 
ordering of affairs between the lawyer and the client at the outset of the 
relationship.  Because doctors have been at the forefront of these efforts, 
this Article will first explain how doctors have tried to use non-disclosure 
agreements and mutual privacy agreements to constrain their patients’ 
online activity and then will assess whether similar efforts would be viable 
in the attorney–client context. 
A. Comparative Perspective: Physicians’ Attempts to Control the Patients’ 
 Online Reviews of Health Care Services 
Physicians were confronted with the issue of online reviews earlier than 
lawyers, so it is instructive to look at some of their efforts to control their 
online reputations.6  Like lawyers, physicians have constraints on their 
ability to respond to negative reviews because of privacy and 
 
physicians, limited data suggests that negative reviews are more inaccurate than positive ones). 
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble, § 12 (2013) (stating that the legal 
profession has a responsibility toward self-governance). 
5. See infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text. 
6. See Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing 
Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 376 (2012) (“The online information 
market place has been particularly responsive to consumer-driven demand for physician-specific 
service reviews”).  For example, in July 2010, Angie’s List created a category for online reviews of 
health care professionals.  ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
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confidentiality obligations.7  This has caused some physicians to try to 
control their online reputation by controlling the content of what their 
patients post online. 
A new industry was created to aid physicians in the defense of their 
online reputations.8  One of these companies, Medical Justice 
Corporation, offers physicians a variety of services to help manage their 
online reputations.9  Medical Justice initially provided its physician 
members with contractual non-disclosure agreements to use at the 
inception of the physician–patient relationship, but those raised a variety 
of public policy and enforcement issues under general contract principles, 
such as unconscionability.10  They also raised practical issues regarding 
enforcement because many online reviews are posted anonymously and 
establishing damages for the breach of these contracts could be difficult.11 
Due to these problems, Medical Justice shifted its strategy to a creative 
use of intellectual property law.12  Medical Justice next provided its 
physician members with a form contract to use with their patients titled 
“Mutual Agreement to Maintain Privacy” (“Mutual Agreement”).13  The 
 
7. See Nicolas P. Terry, Fear of Facebook: Private Ordering of Social Media Risks Incurred by 
Healthcare Providers, 90 NEB. L. REV. 703, 746 (2012) (pointing out that HIPPA law creates 
problems for doctors in responding to online criticism). 
8. See Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing 
Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 362–63 (2012) (providing examples of new 
websites that help to protect physicians’ reputations); see also Nicolas P. Terry, Fear of Facebook: 
Private Ordering of Social Media Risks Incurred by Healthcare Providers, 90 NEB. L. REV. 703, 745 
(2012) (explaining how eMerit provides “medical and dental reputational management”). 
9. See Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing 
Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 362–63 (2012) (detailing how the Medical 
Justice Corporation operates); see also MEDICAL JUSTICE CORPORATION, 
http://www.medicaljustice.com/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (illustrating the use of Medical Justice 
Corporation to “protect against frivolous lawsuits and damage to your good name”). 
10. See Tobias J. Butler, The Realities of Relying on Doctor-Patient Non-Disclosure Agreements for 
Reputational Protection, HEALTH LAW., June 2010, at 23, 23–24 (discussing the enforceability of 
non-disclosure agreements); see also Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s 
Role in Assessing Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 362–63 (2012) (discussing 
how non-disclosure agreements have created a good amount of controversy); Daniel Simmons, 
Company Tries to Stifle Online Reviews with Patient “Gag Orders”, ANGIE’S LIST, (May 28, 2009), 
http://www.angieslist.com/articles/company-tries-stifle-online-reviews-patient-%E2%80%98gag-
orders%E2%80%99.htm (explaining the issues associated with medical gag orders). 
11. See Tobias J. Butler, The Realities of Relying on Doctor-Patient Non-Disclosure Agreements for 
Reputational Protection, HEALTH LAW., June 2010, at 23, 24 (2010) (noting the difficulties in 
enforcing non-disclosure agreements). 
12. See Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing 
Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 394–95 (2012) (discussing the shift of 
enforcement from libel and defamation law to copyright rights). 
13. Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing Physician 
Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 362 (2012); see, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Patient Sues 
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terms of this contract required the patient to assign to the treating 
physician “all intellectual property rights, including copyrights,” in the 
patient’s online reviews of the physician.14  The purported consideration 
for this agreement was the doctor’s promise to maintain the confidentiality 
of the patient’s medical information.15 
The Mutual Agreement was designed to circumvent section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act,16 which protects Internet service providers 
from a variety of claims based on content posted by third parties, such as 
defamation claims, but which does not protect Internet service providers 
from violations of intellectual property law.17  Instead, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)18 shields Internet service providers 
from liability for copyright violations only if they promptly comply with 
takedown requests.19  As a practical matter, if a physician owns the 
copyright to the online reviews of its services, and the physician does not 
like an online review, then the physician can send a takedown notice to the 
Internet service provider on whose site the review appears and the site is 
likely to immediately honor the takedown notice.20 
There are many questions about the validity of these agreements that 
range from the validity of the consideration—physicians already have a 
pre-existing duty to maintain the confidentiality of their patients’ medical 
information—to whether they violate physicians’ ethical rules.21  There 
have been several legal challenges to these Mutual Agreements, but no 
 
Dentist Over Gag Order, Gets Medical Justice to Backtrack, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/11/patient-sues-dentist-over-gag-order-causing-medical-
justice-to-drop-it/ (providing an example of a “Mutual Agreement to Maintain Privacy”). 
14. Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing Physician 
Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 395 (2012). 
15. See id. (explaining that the consideration given in this type of agreement is the 
confidentiality of the patient’s information). 
16. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
17. See Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing 
Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 395 (2012) (detailing how the Medical 
Justice contract circumvents current law); see also Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230 (1996) (offering “protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material”); Leslie 
A. Gordon, A Prescription for Silence, A.B.A J., June 2009, at 14, 14 (June 2009) (describing the 
agreement as “[w]iggling through loopholes in the Communications Decency Act”). 
18. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1332 (2012). 
19. See Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing 
Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 395–96 (2012) (explaining that websites 
may avoid liability by quickly removing questionable posts). 
20. See id. at 396  (illustrating that a valid copyright owner can send a takedown notice to a 
website in order to have an unfavorable review removed). 
21. See id. at 398–403 (explaining what the physician offers in consideration of the contract to 
obtain “the patient’s anticipatory copyright assignment”). 
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rulings regarding their validity.  In 2011, the Center for Democracy & 
Technology filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission that 
alleged that the Mutual Agreements are a deceptive and unfair business 
practice under the Sherman Act.22  In response to that complaint, Medical 
Justice appears to have “retired” the Mutual Agreement contracts from the 
services that it provides its physician members.23  As a Forbes blog post 
has reported: “Indeed, Medical Justice has done a complete reversal on its 
customers.  Having persuaded its customers that patient reviews should be 
suppressed, Medical Justice (under a new brand, eMerit) is now selling 
doctors and dentists a service to help them increase the number of online 
reviews from patients.”24 
Some physicians and dentists, however, are reportedly still using the 
Mutual Agreement.25  One dentist’s patients have filed a class action 
lawsuit challenging the validity of the Mutual Agreement after the dentist 
attempted to enforce the agreement by claiming copyright to a negative 
review that the patient posted on Yelp.26  The district court has denied the 
dentist’s motion to dismiss the complaint, but there is no ruling yet on the 
merits of the case.27 
 
 
22. See id. at 400 (noting that in “November of 2011, the Center for Democracy & 
Technology filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission targeting Medical Justice’s sale of 
MAMPs as a deceptive and unfair business”). 
23. See Eric Goldman, You Shouldn’t Need a Copyright Lawyer to Pick a Dentist, FORBES (Apr. 
17, 2013, 1:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/04/17/you-shouldnt-need-a-
copyright-lawyer-to-pick-a-dentist/ (opining that copyright agreements have no place in medical 
practice). 
24. Id. 
25. See id. (noting that “Medical Justice was so effective at persuading doctors/dentists to fear 
patient reviews that some doctors and dentists are still using the form agreement”). 
26. See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Individual Action for 
Declaratory Relief and Damages, Lee v. Makhnevich, No. 11-civ-8665 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011), 
available at www.citizen.org/documents/Lee-v-Makhnevich-complaint.pdf (describing the case as “a 
class action for declaratory and injunctive relief . . . to recover damages caused by defendants’ 
wrongful conduct”); see also Eric Goldman, You Shouldn’t Need a Copyright Lawyer to Pick a Dentist, 
FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013, 1:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/04/17/you-
shouldnt-need-a-copyright-lawyer-to-pick-a-dentist/ (providing background and context for the class 
action lawsuit filed regarding the validity of the Mutual Agreement used by Medical Justice). 
27. See Class Action Court Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Lee v. Makhnevich, No. 11-
civ-8665 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1347&context=historical (proclaiming that the ultimate result of the case was 
still pending); see also Eric Goldman, You Shouldn’t Need a Copyright Lawyer to Pick a Dentist, 
FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013, 1:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ sites/ericgoldman/2013/04/17/you-
shouldnt-need-a-copyright-lawyer-to-pick-a-dentist/ (detailing the procedural history of the class 
action lawsuit regarding the Mutual Agreement used by a dentist). 
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B. Controlling Client Conduct at the Onset of the Attorney–Client 
 Relationship 
Lawyers who are interested in exercising control over their professional 
reputation may also be inclined to think about addressing this issue at the 
inception of the attorney–client relationship.  Within the constraints set 
out in the rules of professional conduct, attorneys and clients have some 
latitude to contractually define the terms of their relationship.28  
Accordingly, like physicians, lawyers might consider including a provision 
in the lawyer’s engagement letter that would prohibit the client from 
publically commenting on the lawyers’ services during or after the 
conclusion of the representation or that would assign the copyright of 
reviews to the lawyer. 
1. Non-Disclosure Agreements 
As a practical matter, a broad contractual prohibition on publicly 
commenting about a lawyer’s services would prohibit clients who are 
pleased with their lawyers’ services from posting positive reviews just as 
much as it would prohibit disgruntled clients from posting negative 
comments.  In the growing world of information on the Internet, from a 
marketing and business perspective, it may be unwise for a lawyer or law 
firm to constrain the development of any online reputation.29  Also, as a 
practical matter, the enforcement of such an agreement could pose 
significant challenges as many reviews are posted anonymously.30  It is also 
not difficult to imagine a variety of enforcement issues such as determining 
what qualifies as an online review of a lawyer’s services.  Would this 
 
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 6 (2013) (“The scope of services 
provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by terms under which the 
lawyer’s services are made available to the client.”). 
29. See Josh King, Your Business: Someone Online Hates You, THE RECORDER (Aug. 16, 2013, 
4:40 PM) (reporting that “[a]ccording to the latest Nielsen survey data, consumer reviews posted 
online are now the second most trusted source of marketing information for consumers”); see also 
Maria Kantzavelos, Riding the DIY Wave, ILL. B.J., Mar. 2013, at 128, 129 (Mar. 2013) (declaring 
the need for online marketing).  Of course, lawyers can form online reputations in ways other than 
consumer reviews, such as creating their own content on websites, blogs, etc.  See, e.g., Alfredo 
Sciascia, Would-Be Clients Watching, Weighing Online Evaluations, L. OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP., 
June 2009, at 1, 15 (discussing how websites continue “to serve as an effective online platform for 
lawyers to showcase their credentials”). 
30. See Robert D. Richards, Compulsory Process in Cyberspace, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
519, 535 (2013) (noting how anonymous posting has created significant challenges in the legal 
world); see also Jeffrey Segal, Michael J. Sacopulos & Domingo Rivera, Legal Remedies for Online 
Defamation of Physicians, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 349, 349 (2009) (recognizing that “[p]hysicians and 
other health care providers are often criticized on the Internet”—often times anonymously—and at 
essentially no cost to the individual making the harsh review). 
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include an e-mail to three friends?  A post on Facebook?  A post on a blog?  
Or, only posts on formats that potential consumers of legal services are 
likely to review, such as Avvo?  Furthermore, many lawyers would welcome 
the positive feedback and are really just concerned about negative 
comments, particularly when considerations, such as the duty of 
confidentiality, may impair lawyers’ ability to respond to negative 
comments.31  A prohibition on any commentary about a lawyer’s services 
would encompass all types of reviews. 
Setting aside the question of practical limitations arising from a 
contractual agreement, a more important inquiry is whether a contractual 
prohibition on the public dissemination of statements or opinions about a 
lawyer’s services would be permitted under ethical rules.  As a matter of 
public policy, any prohibition on publicly communicating about a lawyer’s 
services would need to exclude any constraints on reporting misconduct to 
disciplinary authorities.32  There are also ethical constraints if this 
provision was construed to release the lawyer prospectively from liability 
for malpractice.33  Therefore, this Article is focusing on the enforceability 
of a provision that would prohibit comments about the lawyers’ services in 
non-adjudicative public forums such as the media and the Internet.  
Because the analysis of this question could vary depending on the rules in 
each state, this Article will focus on the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to evaluate such an agreement. 
Communication is a bedrock principle of the attorney–client 
relationship.  As set out in Model Rule 1.4, “[a] lawyer shall explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation.”34  A lawyer, therefore, 
would, need to explain to the client all of the implications of making an 
agreement to forego public comments about the lawyer’s services to the 
extent reasonably necessary for the client to make an informed decision 
about whether or not to agree to such a provision.  This raises a few 
considerations.  Initially, a client in need of legal assistance may not feel in 
a position to negotiate or refuse the inclusion of such a provision, which 
 
31. See infra Section III. 
32. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (2010) (“It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to . . . enter into an agreement with a client or former client limiting or purporting to 
limit the right of the client or former client to file or pursue any complaint before the Illinois 
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.”) 
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(1) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not make 
an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is 
independently represented in making the agreement . . . .”). 
34. Id. R. 1.4(b). 
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raises a question of whether the disparate bargaining power would impair 
the validity of such an agreement.35  Also, it is fair to question whether a 
lawyer can objectively explain the pros and cons of such a provision to the 
client when the provision would exist solely for the benefit of the lawyer.  
Model Rule 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client when there is 
a significant risk that the representation of the client will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s personal interests.36 
Furthermore, the inclusion of a self-protecting provision that is of no 
benefit to clients is in many respects inconsistent with the fiduciary nature 
of the attorney–client relationship and lawyers’ duty of loyalty to their 
clients.37  Many of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct underscore 
the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client relationship and requiring a 
provision at the outset of the relationship that exists solely for the 
protection of the lawyer may undermine the spirit of these rules.38  
However, the Model Rules do allow for some actions by lawyers during the 
formation of the relationship that are primarily motivated by the lawyer’s 
self-interest, so this concern alone is not necessarily dispositive.  For 
example, the Model Rules permit a lawyer to prospectively limit 
malpractice liability if “the client is independently represented in making 
the agreement.”39  The Model Rules also permit a lawyer to seek an 
advanced conflict waiver in some circumstances.40 
An agreement that prohibits a client from expressing an opinion about a 
lawyer’s services in a public forum is, however, distinguishable from the 
 
35. See Tobias J. Butler, The Realities of Relying on Doctor-Patient Non-Disclosure Agreements for 
Reputational Protection, HEALTH LAW., June 2010, at 23, 23–24 (discussing potential problems with 
the enforceability of non-disclosure agreements in the physician–patient context); Ann Marie 
Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL 
J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 398 (2012) (explaining the enforceability of similar agreements in the 
physician–patient context particularly given the vulnerable position of a patient in need of care). 
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2013) (encouraging a lawyer to refrain 
from representing a client when such representation interferes with the lawyers personal interests). 
37. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (explaining that independent judgment and loyalty are essential in an 
attorney–client relationship and that any conflicts of interest puts this in jeopardy). 
38. Many rules and comments underscore the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client 
relationship.  See, e.g., id. R. 1.7 (showing evidence that the attorney–client relationship is fiduciary 
in nature); id. R. 1.8 (implying the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client relationship); id. R. 1.15 
(explaining that a lawyer must keep client funds separate from his own personal funds). 
39. Id. R. 1.8(h)(1) (declaring that a client must be independently represented when making an 
agreement to prospectively waive liability of the representing attorney). 
40. See id. R. 1.7(b) (stating the conditions under which a lawyer may represent a client 
without being subject to discipline when there is a concurrent conflict of interest); see also id. R. 1.7 
cmt. 22 (explaining the conditions under which a lawyer may obtain a client waiver to avoid being 
subject to discipline). 
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preceding examples.  Unlike limitations on malpractice liability, the Model 
Rules do not require a client who gives up the ability to publicly comment 
on a lawyer’s services to be represented by independent counsel when 
making that agreement.41  Thus, there is no advocate who can advise the 
client about the terms of the relationship without any self-interest in those 
terms.  Also, advanced conflict waivers are predominately, if not 
exclusively, used with fairly sophisticated consumers of legal services.42  A 
prohibition on public commentary about a lawyer’s services would not be 
restricted by its nature to sophisticated purchasers of legal services.  While 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct have some provisions that 
may guide the potential inclusion of a term in a retainer agreement that 
would prohibit public commentary about a lawyer’s services, they do not 
explicitly prohibit it.43 
Courts should, however, consider whether such agreements would be 
void as a matter of public policy.  There are some strong arguments to 
support this.  First, as discussed, such agreements exist to serve the interest 
of lawyers, not the interests of clients.  Therefore, they are inconsistent 
with the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client relationship.44  
Furthermore, the public has difficulty finding meaningful information 
about lawyers whom they may be interested in hiring, and, therefore, 
consumers would benefit from access to more information about 
lawyers.45  From this perspective, as the regulators of legal services, courts 
 
41. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (omitting any mention of the need for a waiver when an 
attorney contractually limits the clients ability to comment regarding the lawyers services). 
42. See Milan Markovic, The Sophisticates: Conflicted Representation and the Lehman Bankruptcy, 
2012 UTAH L. REV. 903, 918–19 (2012) (discussing the complexity of advanced waiver conflicts and 
“[t]he rationale for treating sophisticated and unsophisticated clients differently in terms of waiving 
conflicts of interest”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2013) (“[I]f the 
client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then 
the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to the type of conflict.”). 
43. But see Lucille M. Ponte, Mad Med Posing as Ordinary Consumers: The Essential Role of Self-
Regulation and Industry Ethics on Decreasing Deceptive Online Consumer Ratings and Reviews, 12 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 462, 501–02 (2013) (“Professional ethics codes should expressly 
prohibit these kinds of gag contracts as unethical conduct.”). 
44. See Jan L. Jacobowitz & Kelly Rains Jesson, Fidelity Diluted: Client Confidentiality Gives 
Way to the First Amendment & Social Media, in Virginia State Bar, ex rel. Third District Committee 
v. Horace Frazier Hunter, 36 CAMPBELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6) (“[T]he 
relationship between an attorney and client is a fiduciary relationship of the very highest character.  
All dealings between an attorney and his client that are beneficial to the attorney will be closely 
scrutinized with the utmost strictness for any unfairness.” (citing Lee v. State Bar, 2 Cal. 3d 927, 939 
(1970))). 
45. See, e.g., Alfredo Sciascia, Would-be Clients Watching, Weighing Online Evaluations, LAW. 
OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP., June 2009, at 1, 13 (discussing the impact of the Internet on the 
decision-making of purchasers of legal services). 
6 RIGERTAS_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:12 AM 
254 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:242 
should view non-disclosure as undermining the legal profession’s 
responsibility to assist consumers in their quest for access to information 
about legal services.46 
In addition, getting information from consumers should be beneficial to 
the legal profession’s interest in delivering competent legal services to 
consumers.  A vice president of LexisNexis opined that:  
[T]he prevalence and growing use of ratings systems should motivate lawyers 
to deliver better value and client service.  The result of this pursuit will be a 
more informed potential buyer armed with better and more comprehensive 
information about lawyers under consideration.  All of this contributes to 
better-qualified leads for the law firm and improved service and legal 
outcomes for the client.47 
2. Copyright Assignments 
 
It is also possible that some lawyers may consider including provisions in 
their contracts with clients that emulate the copyright assignments that 
physicians have used, particularly if courts hold that those provisions are 
enforceable.  Such agreements would raise all of the issues discussed above 
with respect to non-disclosure agreements.  Obtaining a legal interest in 
content created by a client would, however, also trigger a lawyer’s 
obligations under Model Rule 1.8(a), which states that a lawyer “shall not 
enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a 
client” unless a variety of factors are satisfied, such as ensuring that the 
terms are fair and reasonable to the client, advising the client of the 
desirability of seeking the advice of independent counsel for the 
transaction, and getting informed consent from the client.48  Therefore, 
an attorney would need to comply with this provision in order to obtain 
an ownership interest in the client’s online reviews. 
There is no evidence showing use of either non-disclosure agreements or 
assignments of copyright in the practice of law.  It is possible that these 
issues will never arise.  If, however, lawyers do try either method, they 
 
46. See Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s Role in Assessing 
Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 402 (2012) (analyzing similar agreements in 
the physician–patient context and concluding that “physicians who use medical gag orders to chill or 
suppress negative online reviews rob their peers of intelligence on patient needs and preferences as 
much as deprive past patients of a voice and prospective patients of useful patient experience data”). 
47. Alfredo Sciascia, Would-be Clients Watching, Weighing Online Evaluations, LAW. OFF. 
MGMT. & ADMIN. REP., June 2009, at 1, 15. 
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2013). 
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should be cognizant of the ethical rules that would govern their conduct.  
They should also recognize that there is a possibility that a court might 
find the provision unenforceable as a matter of public policy.  From a 
normative perspective, courts should find them unenforceable.  They are 
inconsistent with the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client relationship 
and are particularly inappropriate at the formation of that relationship.  
They also frustrate the public’s interest in finding out meaningful 
information about lawyers they might want to hire. 
III.     RESPONDING TO NEGATIVE PUBLIC REVIEWS OF ATTORNEY 
SERVICES 
With the growth of online services lawyers “must recognize that they are 
being publicly evaluated by more parties than ever before and not just on 
their legal ability, but on price, perceived value, their ability to 
communicate with their clients, and many other factors.”49  There are a 
variety of websites that review lawyers and specifically allow consumers to 
post reviews.  These websites include, among others, martindale.com, 
legalreviewz.com, and avvo.com.50  Consumer reviews of lawyers’ services 
can also appear on other sites such as yelp.com,51 yahoo.com,52 and 
google.com.53 
As online reviews of lawyers’ services become more common, the most 
pressing question for lawyers will be how, if at all, they can respond to 
negative reviews.  As discussed below, there are fairly generic ways that 
lawyers can respond that do not raise issues such as client confidentiality.  
If, however, a lawyer wants to respond to specific criticisms regarding the 
handling of a matter, then there are two questions that the lawyer will need 
to answer.  First, does the lawyer’s response contain any confidential client 
 
49. Alfredo Sciascia, Would-be Clients Watching, Weighing Online Evaluations, LAW. OFF. 
MGMT. & ADMIN. REP., June 2009, at 1, 13; see Lucille M. Ponte, Mad Med Posing as Ordinary 
Consumers: The Essential Role of Self-Regulation and Industry Ethics on Decreasing Deceptive Online 
Consumer Ratings and Reviews, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L 462, 463–67 (2013) 
(discussing the decrease in traditional advertising and increase in peer assessment when consumers 
make purchasing decisions); see also Stephanie Francis Ward, Grade Anxiety, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2010 at 
48, 53 (predicting that online reviews of lawyers will increase as the under-30 generation enters the 
workforce). 
50. See, e.g., AVVO, http://www.avvo.com/about_avvo/overview (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) 
(discussing the policies for posting online reviews of lawyers).   
51. YELP, http://www.yelp.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
52. YAHOO, http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
53. See Lawyer Ratings Stir New Controversy, ABA to Investigate, 10-5 PARTNER’S REPORT 2 
(May 2010) (identifying various sites that permit online reviews of lawyers).  See generally GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
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information and, second, if it does, are there any exceptions to the duty of 
confidentiality that would permit the lawyer to disclose that 
information?54 
A. Responding to Negative Reviews Without Revealing Client Specific 
 Information 
     The General Counsel of Avvo, a web site that profiles and rates lawyers, 
has given the following advice to lawyers who receive negative reviews:  
Negative commentary can be a golden marketing opportunity.  By posting a 
professional, meaningful response to negative commentary, an attorney sends 
a powerful message to any readers of that review.  Done correctly, such a 
message communicates responsiveness, attention to feedback and strength of 
character.  The trick is to not get defensive, petty, or feel the need to directly 
refute what you perceive is wrong with the review. . . .  [A] poorly-handled 
response to a negative review is much worse than no response at all.  It makes 
you look thin-skinned and defensive.  Worse yet, if you argue and reveal 
client confidences (or even potential harmful non-confidences), you may be 
subject to discipline.55  
This is good advice.56  Many service providers in a variety of industries 
respond to negative consumer reviews in a generic way that communicates 
that the provider cares about satisfying customers and wants to make 
things right.  For example, responses to online reviews in a variety of 
service industries frequently say things like “We are sorry that you were not 
happy with our service.  Customer satisfaction is very important to us.”  
Some attorneys on Avvo and other similar sites are following this type of 
 
54. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b) (2013) (describing when an attorney 
is permitted to disclose confidential client information). 
55. Josh King, Your Business: Someone Online Hates You, THE RECORDER (Aug. 16, 2013, 4:40 
PM) http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202614786352/Your-Business:-Someone-Online-Hates-
You?slreturn=20140026162748; see Sandra Napoli-D’Arco, What to Do with a Bad Online Review, 
CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/ 
Archives/2013/10/09/snap-d-10-9-13.aspx (explaining that a simple, to the point, professional 
response to a negative online review has a positive impact on readers); see also Frank J. Cavaliere, 
Web-Wise Lawyer, PRAC. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 11, 12 (discussing Avvo.com and lawyerratingz.com); 
Frequently Asked Questions, LAWYERRATINGZ, http://www.lawyerratingz.com/faq.jsp#3 (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2014) (allowing lawyers to post responses to online review but offering no ethical guidance 
in doing so). 
56. See, e.g., Martha Chan, Have You Googled Your Name Lately, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 2013, 
at 38, 39–40 (recommending a variety of ways to soften the impact of negative online reviews); accord 
Debra Bruce, How Lawyers Can Handle Bad Reviews and Complaints on Social Media, TEX. B.J., MAY 
2012, at 402, 403 (supporting the notion of trying to generate as much positive content as possible to 
negate bad reviews). 
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advice.57 
There are, however, starting to be some cases where lawyers have found 
themselves subject to potential discipline by responding in a manner that 
reveals client confidences.  In August 2013 the Illinois Attorney 
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (“ARDC”) filed a disciplinary 
complaint against an attorney who posted a response to a former client’s 
negative online review on Avvo.58  The complaint alleged that a former 
client wrote: “She only wants your money, claims ‘always on your side’ is a 
huge lie.  Paid her to help me secure unemployment, she took my money 
knowing full well a certain law in Illinois would not let me collect 
unemployment.  [N]ow is billing me for an additional $1500 for her 
time.”59  Avvo removed the post sometime later, but then the client 
posted another similar review.60  In response to this second negative 
review, the complaint alleged that the lawyer posted the following reply:  
This is simply false.  The person did not reveal all the facts of his situation 
up front in our first and second meeting. . . .  When I received his personnel 
file, I discussed the contents of it with him and informed him that he would 
likely lose unless the employer chose not to contest the unemployment 
(employers sometimes do . . .).  Despite knowing that he would likely lose, 
he chose to go forward with a hearing to try to obtain benefits.  I dislike it 
very much when my clients lose but I cannot invent positive facts for clients 
when they are not there.  I feel badly for him but his own actions in beating 
up a female coworker are what caused the consequences he is now so upset 
about.61  
Paragraph 22 of the ARDC’s complaint states:  
By stating in her April 11, 2013 AVVO posting that Rinehart beat up a 
female coworker, Respondent revealed information that she had obtained 
from Rinehart about the termination of his employment.  Respondent’s 
statements in the posting were designed to intimidate and embarrass 
 
57. See, e.g., AVVO, http://www.avvo.com/attorneys/60601-il-stephen-phillips-1126711/ 
reviews.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (showing an example of a statement made by a lawyer 
responding to a negative online review which stated, “We strive for the utmost in client satisfaction, 
and we’re sorry to hear that you had this experience.  Please contact us directly so we can address your 
specific concerns”). 
58. See, e.g., In the Matter of Tsamis, Ill. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n, Comm. 
No. 2013PR00095 (2013), available at http://www.iardc.org/13PR0095CM.html (providing an 
example of a disciplinary complaint hearing after an attorney responded to a negative online review in 
Avvo). 
59. Id. at 4. 
60. See id. (alleging that although Avvo removed the post, the client posted a similar review 
sometime later). 
61. Id. at 5. 
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Rinehart and to keep him from posting additional information about her on 
the AVVO website.62  
Paragraph 23 of the complaint concluded that the conduct constituted 
misconduct in three separate ways: it revealed confidential information in 
violation of Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a), it used means 
intended to embarrass, delay or burden a third person in violation of 
Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4, and it was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.63 
Based on the wording of the first sentence in Paragraph 22 of the 
complaint, it is possible the ARDC was seeking to discipline the attorney 
based on the last sentence in the post and that the ARDC found the rest of 
the post permissible under Illinois Rule 1.6(b).64  It is somewhat 
ambiguous as to whether the complaint was only focused on the statement 
about the coworker or whether the ARDC found other parts of the post 
problematic because they were intended to embarrass or were prejudicial to 
the administration of justice.  In a subsequent joint stipulation of the facts, 
the parties simply stipulated that this post “exceeded what was necessary to 
respond to Rinehart’s accusations.”65  The attorney was reprimanded.66 
Another lawyer faced similar disciplinary charges in Georgia.67  While 
fewer details are available about the exact comments posted, the decision 
rejecting the attorney’s petition for voluntary discipline stated:  
Ms. Skinner admitted that, after the client had notified Ms. Skinner that the 
client had discharged Ms. Skinner and had obtained new counsel, Ms. 
Skinner posted on the [I]nternet personal and confidential information 
about the client that Ms. Skinner had gained in her professional relationship 
with the client.  Ms. Skinner posted the information in response to negative 
 
62. Id. 
63. See id. at 6 (alleging that the attorney should be subject to discipline). 
64. See also William Wernz, This Month’s Topic: Online Ratings of Lawyers, MINN. LAWYERING 
(Oct. 1, 2013), http://minnesotalawyering.com/2013/10/october-2013-minnesota-ethics-update/ 
(noting that disclosure of the specifics of the case was what likely subjected the attorney to 
disciplinary action). 
65. In the Matter of Tsamis, Joint Stipulation and Recommendation for a Reprimand by the 
Hearing Board, Ill. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n, Comm. No. 2013PR00095 (2013), 
available at https://www.iardc.org/rd_database/rulesdecisions.html (search under “Exact Match”; 
enter in “Tsamis”; then follow “Tsamis, Betty” hyperlink). 
66. In the Matter of Tsamis, Reprimand, Ill. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n, 
Comm. No. 2013PR00095 (2013), available at https://www.iardc.org/rd_database/ rulesdecisions. 
html (search under “Exact Match”; enter in “Tsamis”; then follow “Tsamis, Betty” hyperlink). 
67. See In re Skinner, 740 S.E.2d 171, 173 (Ga. 2013) (ruling that the attorney was required 
not to disclose confidential client information). 
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reviews of Ms. Skinner the client had posted on consumer websites.68  
The court specifically noted that “the record does not reflect the nature 
of the disclosures (except that they concern personal and confidential 
information) or the actual or potential harm to the client as a result of the 
disclosures.”69 
1. Analyzing Confidentiality 
These disciplinary complaints raise the basic confidentiality analysis that 
any lawyer must undertake before responding to an online review in a 
manner that contains specific information.  First, does the response 
contain confidential information and second, if so, is the lawyer permitted 
to reveal it under any exceptions?  For example, a client could give 
informed consent to a disclosure or the client could waive the right to 
confidentiality.70  However, the exception most likely to be considered in 
this situation is the self-defense provision of ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(5).71  
Model Rule 1.6(a) states, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating 
to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, 
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”72  The 
comments provide that the rule “applies not only to matters 
communicated in confidence by the client, but also to all information 
relating to the representation, whatever its source.”73  One of the 
exceptions in subsection (b) permits a lawyer to reveal confidential 
information “to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client . . . or to respond to 
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the 
 
68. Id. at 172. 
69. Id. at 173 n.6. 
70. For example, if the client’s review of the attorney’s services contains previously confidential 
information, that information may become generally known and no longer be considered 
confidential.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (2007) 
(“Confidential client information consists of information relating to representation of a client, other 
than information that is generally known.”). 
71. See, e.g., Ill. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, Comm. No. 2013PR00095 
(2013), available at http://www.iardc.org/13PR0095CM.html (illustrating an example of additional 
rules that constrain a lawyer’s conduct). 
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2013). 
73. Id. R. 1.6(a) cmt. 3; see Jan L. Jacobowitz & Kelly Rains Jesson, Fidelity Diluted: Client 
Confidentiality Gives Way to the First Amendment & Social Media in Virginia State Bar, ex rel. Third 
District Committee v. Horace Frazier Hunter, 36 CAMPBELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing 
the ABA Model Rules’ very broad definition of confidential information, which has no exception for 
information that is in the public record). 
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client.”74  An issue that may confront lawyers is whether their responses to 
clients’ online reviews reveal confidential information and, if so, whether 
such revelations are permissible under Model Rule 1.6(b). 
2. Is the Information Confidential? 
A lawyer contemplating posting a response to an online review that 
contains information specific to the client’s matter will obviously need to 
be familiar with the law of the governing jurisdiction regarding 
confidentiality.  It is important to note one of the more controversial 
recent developments regarding the scope of confidential information—
Hunter v. Virginia State Bar.75  In Hunter, an attorney was disciplined for 
maintaining a blog that discussed a variety of legal issues and cases, but was 
mainly focused on discussing the specifics of favorable outcomes that 
attorney, Hunter, obtained for his clients.76  Hunter’s blog specifically 
identified his clients’ names and some of the facts regarding their cases.77  
The Virginia State Bar (“VSB”) launched an investigation into the blog 
and charged Hunter with violating the Virginia Rules of Professional 
Conduct that relate to advertising and confidential information.78 
During a hearing, one of Hunter’s former clients “testified that he did 
not consent to information about his cases being posted on Hunter’s blog 
and believed that the information posted was embarrassing or detrimental 
to him, despite the fact that all such information had previously been 
revealed in court.”79  Hunter contended that he did not need to obtain his 
client’s consent to discuss their cases on his blog “because all the 
information that he posted was public information.”80  He also argued 
that his blog was political speech, not commercial speech, and that the 
 
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2013). 
75. Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2013). 
76. See id. at 613 (evaluating the nature of Hunter’s blog inasmuch as it was primarily a vehicle 
to promote his own litigation record). 
77. See id. at 614 (“[T]he postings of Hunter’s case wins on his webpage advertised cumulative 
case results.”). 
78. Id.; VA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2010):  
A lawyer shall not reveal information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable 
law or other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be 
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be 
detrimental to the client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that 
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation . . . .  
Id. 
79. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 614. 
80. Id. 
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VSB’s position on the matter violated his First Amendment rights.81 
The VSB disagreed that Hunter was free to post public information 
about his clients and held that Hunter violated Virginia Rule 1.6.82  The 
VSB also found that part of the purpose of the blog was to advertise 
Hunter’s law firm and, therefore, it needed to comply with the Virginia 
Rules of Professional Conduct 7.1 and 7.2 that prohibit advertisements 
from being misleading and require them to contain certain disclaimers.83 
Hunter appealed to a three-judge panel of the circuit court, which ruled 
that the VSB’s interpretation of Virginia Rule 1.6 violated the First 
Amendment, but that its interpretation of Virginia Rules 7.1 and 7.2 did 
not violate the First Amendment.84  Hunter then appealed to the Virginia 
Supreme Court.85  The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the circuit 
court that the blog was commercial speech even though it was 
intermingled with some political speech and, accordingly, it analyzed the 
restrictions and disclaimer requirements in Virginia Rule 7.1 and 7.2 
under the Central Hudson test86 that the Supreme Court of the United 
States has articulated for government restraints on commercial speech.87  
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the VSB established a substantial 
government interest in protecting the public from potentially misleading 
advertising and, therefore, the advertising rules did not violate the First 
Amendment.88 
The Supreme Court of Virginia next turned to the question of whether 
Virginia Rule 1.6 violated Hunter’s First Amendment rights.  The VSB 
argued that Hunter violated Virginia Rule 1.6 “by disclosing potentially 
embarrassing information about his clients on his blog ‘in order to advance 
his personal economic interests.’”89  Hunter argued that his blog posts 
 
81. See id. at 617 (“Hunter chose to comingle sporadic political statements within his self-
promoting blog posts in an attempt to camouflage the true commercial nature of his blog.”). 
82. See id. at 614 (“Specifically, the VSB found that the information in Hunter’s blog posts 
‘would be embarrassing or be likely to be detrimental’ to clients and he did not receive consent from 
his clients to post such information.”). 
83. See id. at 617 (noting that Hunter’s blog contained “self-promoting blog posts”). 
84. See id. at 613–14 (appealing to a three-judge panel of the circuit court, where the court 
subsequently heard Hunter’s argument). 
85. See id. at 615 (deciding to hear the question of whether “‘[t]he Ruling of the Circuit Court 
finding a violation of Rules 7.1(a)(4) and 7.2(a)(3) conflicts with the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States’”). 
86. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
87. See Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 617–19 (discussing the four-prong analysis set forth in Central 
Hudson). 
88. See id. at 619 (“These regulations directly advance [the VSB’s] interest and are not more 
restrictive than necessary, unlike outright bans on advertising.”). 
89. Id. 
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were entitled to First Amendment protection because they only revealed 
information that had previously been disclosed in public judicial 
proceedings.90  The Supreme Court of Virginia framed the issue as 
“whether the state may prohibit an attorney from discussing information 
about a client or former client that is not protected by attorney–client 
privilege without express consent from that client.”91 
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with Hunter and held that, as a 
general rule, the state may not prohibit a lawyer from discussing 
information about a client or former client that is not protected by the 
attorney–client privilege.92  The court reasoned that attorney speech may 
be regulated if it poses a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a 
pending case, but it may not be regulated regarding public information 
about criminal cases that have been tried in courts that were open to the 
public and have reached a conclusion.93  The court further reasoned that 
the “VSB concedes that all of the information that was contained within 
Hunter’s blog was public information and would have been protected 
speech had the news media or others disseminated it.”94  As one article 
concluded, the court’s opinion essentially holds that “it is irrelevant 
whether an attorney’s blog post is embarrassing or detrimental to his client, 
as long as the information in the blog is part of the public record.”95  
Hunter is not, however, without its critics.  Professor Peter Joy has opined:  
In effect, the Virginia Supreme Court has created a public records or public 
knowledge exception to client confidentiality, which erodes the duty of 
loyalty lawyers owe current and former clients . . . .  Now lawyers can 
embarrass and humiliate former clients with impunity as long as they use 
confidential information that is in the public records.  The court’s ruling is 
in direct contradiction with the rules of professional conduct.96 
 
90. See id. (arguing that the VSB’s interpretation of Rule 1.6 is unconstitutional because the 
matters discussed in his blogs were public information). 
91. Id. 
92. See id. (holding in favor of Hunter’s speech protections). 
93. See id. at 619–20 (settling the question about whether public information from past cases is 
protected by the First Amendment). 
94. Id. at 620. 
95. Jan L. Jacobowitz & Kelly Rains Jesson, Fidelity Diluted: Client Confidentiality Gives Way to 
the First Amendment & Social Media in Virginia State Bar, ex rel. Third District Committee v. 
Horace Frazier Hunter, 36 CAMPBELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
96. David L. Hudson, Jr., Commercial Ahead: Virginia Supreme Court Holds That Advertising 
Rules May Be Applied to a Lawyer’s Blog, A.B.A. J. Nov. 2013, at 20, 21; see also Jan L. Jacobowitz & 
Kelly Rains Jesson, Fidelity Diluted: Client Confidentiality Gives Way to the First Amendment & Social 
Media in Virginia State Bar, ex rel. Third District Committee v. Horace Frazier Hunter, 36 
CAMPBELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (quoting Peter A. Joy, quoted in David L. Hudson, Jr., 
Commercial Ahead, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2013, at 20, 21). 
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Another article noted that Hunter is novel in its creation of an exception 
to the client confidentiality rule—“public record information when a case 
has concluded.”97  “In fact, other state courts have expressly held that the 
rule of confidentiality is not nullified simply because the information has 
become part of the public record.”98 
The Supreme Court of the United States has denied a petition for a writ 
of certiorari in Hunter, so it is not clear how much impact this decision 
will have beyond Virginia until the Court is presented with the question of 
whether ethical rules that constrain lawyers from discussing publicly 
available information about their clients violate lawyers’ First Amendment 
rights.99  Until then, if other state courts follow the holding in Hunter, 
that reasoning would impact the analysis of an attorney’s response to a 
negative online review in that an attorney would be able to discuss the 
specifics of the client’s matter in the response to the online review as long 
as those specifics had become a matter of public record.  Many states, 
however, have a much broader definition of confidential information; thus, 
any attorney contemplating a response to an online review that contains 
client specific information would be wise to be familiar with the law in the 
governing jurisdiction.100 
3. If the Information Is Confidential, Is It Subject to the Self-Defense 
Exception in Rule 1.6(b)(5)? 
If a lawyer wants to include information in a response to a negative 
online review that could be construed as confidential information, the 
lawyer should next assess whether the information could still be revealed as 
an exception to the general confidentiality rule.  ABA Model Rule 1.6(5), 
which is frequently known as the self-defense exception, permits a lawyer 
 
97. Jan L. Jacobowitz & Kelly Rains Jesson, Fidelity Diluted: Client Confidentiality Gives Way to 
the First Amendment & Social Media in Virginia State Bar, ex rel. v. Horace Frazier Hunter, 36 
CAMPBELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (quoting Peter A. Joy, quoted in David L. Hudson, Jr., 
Commercial Ahead, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2013, at 20, 21). 
98. Id. 
99. See Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 133 S. Ct. 2871, 2871 (2013) (denying certiorari). 
100. See, e.g., Jan L. Jacobowitz & Kelly Rains Jesson, Fidelity Diluted: Client Confidentiality 
Gives Way to the First Amendment & Social Media in Virginia State Bar, ex rel. Third District 
Committee v. Horace Frazier Hunter, 36 CAMPBELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 30) 
(referencing In re Skinner and Hunter as cases involving the interpretation of when “confidential 
information” is revealed); Ellen Yankiver Suni, Ethical Issues for Innocence Projects, 70 UMKC L. REV. 
921, 938–39 (2002) (noting the broad definition of confidential information according to the 
Restatement as “information relating to representation of a client, other than information that is 
generally known” and discussing the import of the fact that “[c]onfidentiality duties continue after 
conclusion of the representation”).  
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to reveal confidential information:  
[T]o establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge 
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was 
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer’s representation of the client.101  
The comments to the rule suggest that a lawyer may be able to make 
some responses prior to the actual commencement of a proceeding.  
Comment 10 states in part:  
Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in 
a client’s conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation 
of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary to establish a defense. . . .  The lawyer’s right to respond 
arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made.  Paragraph (b)(5) 
does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or 
proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established 
by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion.  The 
right to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been 
commenced.102  
Any disclosures permitted under Rule 1.6(b) must be limited to those 
disclosures that the lawyer “reasonably believes necessary.”103 
As with all of these issues, any lawyer seeking to disclose confidential 
information in response to a negative online review will need to research 
the law of the governing jurisdiction regarding the scope of the self-defense 
exception.  For example, there is a split in the authority as to whether a 
former client’s claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 
allows former counsel to reveal confidential information under the self-
defense exception.104  The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility issued an ethics opinion that found that the 
self-defense exception did not apply in this circumstance.105  Its reasoning 
may be informative about the application of the self-defense exception in 
response to negative online reviews because it limits the exception to 
circumstances where the lawyer needs to defend against charges that 
 
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2013). 
102. Id. R. 1.6(b) cmt. 10 (emphasis added). 
103. Id. R. 1.6(b). 
104. See generally RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE 
LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §§ 1.6-12(a)–(h) (2013–2014 ed.) 
(recognizing and analyzing exceptions to the revelation of confidential client information). 
105. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010). 
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imminently threaten the lawyer with serious consequences:  
  The self-defense exception applies in various contexts, including when 
and to the extent reasonably necessary to defend against a criminal, civil[,] or 
disciplinary claim against the lawyer.  The rule allows the lawyer, to the 
extent reasonably necessary, to make disclosures to a third party who credibly 
threatens to bring such a claim against the lawyer in order to persuade the 
third party that there is no basis for doing so.  For example, the lawyer may 
disclose information relating to the representation insofar as necessary to 
dissuade a prosecuting, regulatory[,] or disciplinary authority from initiating 
proceedings against the lawyer or others in the lawyer’s firm, and need not 
wait until charges or claims are filed before invoking the self-defense 
exception.  Although the scope of the exception has expanded over time, the 
exception is a limited one, because it is contrary to the fundamental premise 
that client[–]lawyer confidentiality ensures client trust and encourages the 
full and frank disclosure necessary to an effective representation.  
Consequently, it has been said that ‘[a] lawyer may act in self-defense under 
[the exception] only to defend against charges that imminently threaten the 
lawyer or the lawyer’s associate or agent with serious consequences . . . .106  
Similarly, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states that a 
lawyer may only reveal client confidences “to defend against charges that 
imminently threaten the lawyer or the lawyer’s associate or agent with 
serious consequences, including criminal charges, claims of legal 
malpractice, and other civil actions . . . .”107  The Restatement further 
opines that the disclosure of confidential information in self-defense is 
warranted only when it constitutes a “proportionate and restrained 
response to the charges.”108  Therefore, “[t]he concept of necessity 
precludes disclosure in responding to casual charges, such as comments not 
likely to be taken seriously by others.”109  This same comment, however, 
later states that “[w]hen a client has made a public charge of wrongdoing, a 
lawyer is warranted in making a proportionate and restrained public 
response.”110 
The weight of the limited authority suggests that negative comments 
about a lawyer’s services on an online forum would not trigger the self-
defense exception under ABA Model Rule 1.6(5), if such comments 
 
106. Id. (discussing the ABA Model Rule that allows for a self-defense exception giving lawyers 
the ability to reveal confidential client information in certain situations). 
107. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. c (2007). 
108. Id. § 64 cmt. e. 
109. Id.   
110. Id. 
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amount to “mere criticism.”111  Two recent California ethics opinions 
have specifically examined the issue of responding to a former client’s 
adverse public comments.112  California, however, has not adopted a self-
defense provision similar to ABA Model Rule 1.6(5).113  The Los Angeles 
County Bar Association Professional Responsibility and Ethics Committee 
published an ethics opinion concluding that a lawyer may respond, but 
only if the response “does not disclose confidential or attorney–client 
privileged information . . . [and is not] in a manner that will injure [the 
former client] in a matter involving the former representation.”114  This 
opinion is qualified by an assumption that the client’s post does not 
contain any confidential information and there is no litigation or 
arbitration pending between the attorney and former client.115 
The Bar Association of San Francisco wrote a similar ethics opinion that 
concluded:  
While the online review could have an impact on the attorney's reputation, 
absent a consent or waiver, disclosure of otherwise confidential information 
is not ethically permitted in California unless there is a formal complaint by 
the client, or an inquiry from a disciplinary authority based on a complaint 
by the client.  Even in situations where disclosure is permitted, disclosure 
should occur only in the context of the formal proceeding or inquiry, and 
should be narrowly tailored to the issues raised by the former client.  If the 
matter previously handled for the former client has not concluded, 
depending on the circumstances, it may be inappropriate for the attorney to 
provide any substantive response in the online forum, even one that does not 
disclose confidential information.116  
The opinion noted that California’s rules of professional conduct do not 
have a self-defense provision similar to the Model Rules, but that such an 
 
111. ELLEN J. BENNETT, ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 
§ 1.6 (2011). 
112. See L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 525 (2012) (examining the ethical duties of lawyers 
in connection with adverse comments published by a former client). 
113. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(5) (2013) (discussing the “self-defense” 
exception to disclosing confidential client information); see also L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 
525 (2012) (examining California’s lack of a self-defense exception similar to ABA Model Rule 
1.6(5)). 
114. L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 525 (2012). 
115. See id. (qualifying the committee’s opinion with the requirements that: (1) any online 
comments be void of confidential information and (2) that there not be ongoing litigation “between 
the attorney and former client”). 
116. Bar Ass’n of S.F. Opinion 2014-1 (2014). 
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exception can be found in its statutory and case law.117  However, the 
opinion looked at the interpretations of the Model Rules, as well as the 
Restatement, to conclude that a lawyer could provide a general response to 
an online review by a former client, but the attorney could not disclose 
confidential information absent the client’s informed consent or a waiver 
of confidentiality.118 
There is one ethics opinion by the Los Angeles County Bar Association 
Professional Responsibility and Ethics Committee that examines the issue 
of responding to a former client’s adverse public comments.119  
California, however, has not adopted a self-defense provision similar to 
Model Rule 1.6(5).120  Thus, this ethics opinion concludes that a lawyer 
may respond but only if the response “does not disclose confidential or 
attorney-client privileged information . . . [and is not] in a manner that 
will injure [the former client] in a matter involving the former 
representation.”121  This opinion is qualified by an assumption that the 
client’s post does not contain any confidential information and there is no 
litigation or arbitration pending “between the attorney and former 
client.”122 
The weight of the limited authority suggests that negative comments 
about a lawyer’s services on an online forum would not trigger the self-
defense exception under Model Rule 1.6(5), if such comments amount to 
“mere criticism.”123  For example, there is a formal ethics opinion that the 
New York County Lawyers’ Association Committee on Professional Ethics 
drafted in 1997 that concludes a lawyer could not reveal confidential 
information under the self-defense exception after the client complained to 




119. See L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 525 (2012) (examining the ethical duties of lawyers 
in connection with adverse comments published by a former client). 
120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(5) (2013) (discussing the “self-defense” 
exception to disclosing confidential client information); see also L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 
525 (2012) (examining California’s lack of a self-defense exception similar to ABA Model Rule 
1.6(5)). 
121. L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 525 (2012). 
122. See id. (qualifying the committee’s opinion with the requirements that: (1) any online 
comments be void of confidential information and (2) that there not be ongoing litigation “between 
the attorney and former client”). 
123. ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 
§ 1.6 (2011). 
124. See N.Y. Cnty. Law. Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 722 (1997) (discussing 
confidences and secrets and how they play into defending oneself against public criticism). 
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[I]t is the opinion of this Committee that [the self-defense exception] applies 
only to accusations of “wrongful conduct” that are actionable, involving the 
threat of an imminent proceeding, and not merely to negative references or 
gossip about the attorney.  Thus, a lawyer may not reveal client confidences 
and secrets only to protect his or her reputation against unfavorable or 
unflattering characterizations regarding the lawyer or the lawyer’s services 
unless such characterizations are subject to an impending charge or claim 
brought before a body empowered to rule on such matters.  Indeed, an 
interpretation of the rule that would allow lawyers to divulge protected 
information based on disapproving references or depictions, without more, is 
inconsistent with the solemn duty . . . to preserve client confidences and 
secrets.125  
From the standpoint of lawyers and their rules of professional conduct, 
either refraining from responding to a negative online review or doing so 
in a way that does not reveal any client confidences is the safest course for 
lawyers.  If a lawyer is going to include any client specific information in 
the response, the lawyer should consider whether the information would 
be considered confidential information and, if so, whether the self-defense 
exception could apply under the law of the governing jurisdiction.  It is 
unlikely, however, that most courts would construe the self-defense 
exception to apply to responses to negative online reviews.  To the extent 
that there is ambiguity in the rules of the various states about whether or 
not public criticism of a lawyer gives rise to the self-defense exception, the 
state supreme courts should consider revising their rules to remove any 
such ambiguity. 
From the perspective of consumers and the reputation of the legal 
profession, it is probably helpful for consumers to see a non-defensive 
generic response that indicates that the lawyer takes seriously complaints 
by former clients, cares about client satisfaction and is professional in 
dealing with criticism.  There is, however, a risk that the public will be 
deceived by online reviews that contain false information or that are 
otherwise misleading to which a lawyer may not be able to provide an 
adequate response due to confidentiality requirements.  Because lawyers 
are constrained from providing their side of the story, however, the public 
does not benefit from one of the principles of free speech—“sunlight is the 
most powerful of all disinfectants.”126  In such instances, a lawyer might 
consider filing a suit for defamation. 
 
125. Id. 
126. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 305 (1964) (quoting Justice Brandeis). 
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4. Defamation Lawsuits 
A lawyer who believes that comments in an online review are 
defamatory false statements of fact could file a lawsuit for defamation 
against the client.127  A defamation suit, however, poses substantial 
hurdles as a remedy for controlling one’s online reputation.128  As an 
initial matter, a defamation suit only covers false statements of defamatory 
fact.129  It does not cover opinions and many negative online reviews may 
only contain opinions.130  Satisfying the elements of the cause of action 
can also be difficult given the First Amendment protections for speech.131  
Furthermore, negative comments will remain online until there is a 
judgment.132  Courts will not order allegedly defamatory content to be 
removed during the pendency of a lawsuit because that is considered a 
prior restraint on speech that violates the First Amendment.133  Despite 
these hurdles, some lawyers have successfully brought defamation claims 
against prior clients thus making it a possible remedy to a false and 
defamatory online review of a lawyer’s services.134 
 
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977) (“One who publishes a 
defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true.”); Id. 
§ 566 (holding that an opinion “is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed 
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion”).  See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 339 (1974) (holding that private individuals may sue for defamation because states can 
“constitutionally allow private individuals to recover damages for defamation on the basis of any 
standard of care except liability without fault”). 
128. See, e.g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256–65 (examining some of the difficulties posed 
in order for one to prevail in a defamation suit); see also Carl Franzen, Critical Yelp Comments Allowed 
to Stand After Virginia Supreme Court Ruling, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jan. 3, 2013, 7:35 PM), 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/idealab/critical-yelp-comments-allowed-to-stand-after-virginia-
supreme-court-ruling (illustrating the difficulties individuals face when the defaming statements are 
allowed to remain online). 
129. See Lauren Guicheteau, What Is the Media in the Age of the Internet? Defamation Law and 
the Blogosphere, 8 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 573, 577 (2013) (stating that most actions for 
defamation require several factors, including a false statement published that causes harm to the 
individual due to the publisher’s negligence). 
130. See id. (explaining that the First Amendment protects opinions from defamation suits 
(citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990))). 
131. See Carl Franzen, Critical Yelp Comments Allowed to Stand after Virginia Supreme Court 
Ruling, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jan. 3, 2013, 7:35 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/idealab/ 
critical-yelp-comments-allowed-to-stand-after-virginia-supreme-court-ruling (noting that an initial 
win—for keeping defamatory information online through the trial process—was a win for First 
Amendment rights). 
132. See id. (stating that the Virginia courts decided that the defamatory material could remain 
online during the duration of the trial). 
133. See, e.g., id. (describing how Virginia courts allowed the comments at issue to remain 
online during a defamatory suit). 
134. See, e.g., Afshari v. Barer, 769 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y. App. Term 2003) (affirming a 
claim for defamation regarding statements made during correspondence between the opposing 
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Any lawyer who files a defamation suit should be aware of the risk of 
being found liable for the defendant’s attorneys’ fees under state anti-
SLAPP laws135 (SLAPP is an acronym for “Strategic Litigation Against 
Public Participation”).  Anti-SLAPP laws136 exist in many states and are 
designed to prevent lawsuits that are filed to silence a voice of criticism.137  
Not every state has an anti-SLAPP law and the states that do have them 
vary in terms of the scope and strength of the law.138 
California, for example, has a broad anti-SLAPP law that defines 
protected activities to include any “written or oral statements [or writing] 
made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.”139  
California courts have interpreted this provision to apply to anonymous 
comments on a website regarding a company’s business practices and 
 
parties); see also Debra Bruce, How Lawyers Can Handle Bad Reviews and Complaints on Social Media, 
TEX. B.J., May 2012, at 402, 403 (maintaining that a lawyer should avoid lashing out at a 
complaining client who states one’s grievances online (citing Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354 
(6th Dist. 2010))); Josh King, Your Business: Someone Online Hates You, THE RECORDER (Aug. 16, 
2013, 4:40 PM), http://www.therecorder.com/management/id=1202614786352/Your%20Business 
%20Someone%20Online%20Hates%20You?slreturn=20140015105825# (illustrating how the 
lawyer does, however, risk the “Streisand Effect,” meaning that bringing attention to the negative 
review can result in it getting greater attention than it would have if the lawyer had ignored it). 
135. See id. (stating that one must pay defendant’s attorneys’ fees due to anti-SLAPP laws if 
one loses the case); see also Debra Bruce, How Lawyers Can Handle Bad Reviews and Complaints on 
Social Media, TEX. B.J., May 2012, at 402, 403 (noting that a dentist who sued and lost was ordered 
to pay the opposing side’s attorneys’ fees). 
136. See generally Dena M. Richardson, Comment, Power Play: An Examination of Texas’s Anti-
SLAPP Statute and Its Protection of Free Speech Through Accelerated Dismissal, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 245 
(2014) (providing background on anti-SLAPP laws).  
137. See Marc J. Randazza, The Need for a Unified and Cohesive National Anti-SLAPP Law, 91 
OR. L. REV. 627, 627–28 (2012) (describing how SLAPP laws protect online speech). 
138. See id. (illustrating that states have differing laws regarding SLAPP suits). 
139. Todd C. Taylor, Blogger’s Liability for Third-Party Comments and Content: A Growing 
Legal Threat for Bloggers or Plaintiffs’ Lingering Ignorance of the Law?, 30 NO. 13 WESTLAW J. 
COMPUTER & INTERNET at 1, 4 (Nov. 30, 2012) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)).  The 
legislative intent of the California anti-SLAPP law is as follows:  
The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought 
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition 
for the redress of grievances.  The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to 
encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation 
should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process.  To this end, this section shall be 
construed broadly.  
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (Deering Supp. 2014).  But see Robert D. Richards, A SLAPP in 
the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation on Social Networks, 
Blogs and Consumer Gripe Sites, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 221, 232 (2011) 
(discussing anti-SLAPP laws with a far narrower scope such as Pennsylvania, which only provides 
immunity to someone who “makes an oral or written communication to a government agency 
relating to enforcement or implementation of an environmental law or regulation”). 
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reasoned “that ‘websites that are accessible free of charge to any member of 
the public where members of the public may read the views and 
information posted, and post their own opinions, meet the definition of a 
public forum . . . .’”140  If a defendant files a motion to strike a complaint 
under the anti-SLAPP statute, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.141  If the court 
grants the defendant’s motion to strike, the defendant is entitled to 
attorneys’ fees and costs.142  Some anti-SLAPP statutes impose additional 
penalties.143 
A recent dispute in an unreported decision highlights many of the 
foregoing issues in the attorney–client context.144  In Gwire v. 
Blumberg,145 an unhappy former client anonymously posted negative 
comments about attorney William Gwire on complaintsboard.com.146  
The comments stated, in part, “Gwire committed a horrific fraud against 
me that has irreparably damaged every aspect of my life.  I hope this partial 
summary of Gwire’s incredibly unethical history may help other innocent 
people.”147  Gwire posted a response on the forum:  
In his rebuttal, Gwire called Blumberg “not only unreliable but a proven 
liar.”  The rebuttal referred to Blumberg as “a mentally unbalanced former 
client . . . who has a history of taking bizarre, and even criminal actions 
 
140. Todd C. Taylor, Blogger’s Liability for Third-Party Comments and Content: A Growing 
Legal Threat for Bloggers or Plaintiffs’ Lingering Ignorance of the Law?, 30 NO. 13 WESTLAW J. 
COMPUTER & INTERNET 1, 4 (2012) (citing Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1569 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2005)); see Robert D. Richards, A SLAPP in the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation on Social Networks, Blogs and Consumer Gripe Sites, 21 DEPAUL 
J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 221, 224–30 (2011) (reviewing the “growing trend of businesses 
and professionals suing consumers who griped about them online” and the role of anti-SLAPP laws). 
141. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (Deering Supp. 2014) (stating that causes of 
action that raise free speech rights regarding matters of public interest are “subject to a special motion 
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that 
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim”). 
142. See id. § 425.16(c) (permitting the court to award attorney’s fees to the defendant if the 
defendant prevails on a special motion to strike). 
143. Marc J. Randazza, Nevada’s New Anti-SLAPP Law: The Silver State Sets the Gold Standard, 
NEV. LAW., OCT. 2013, at 7, 9–10 (discussing amendments to Nevada’s anti-SLAPP law that make 
it one of the strongest protectors of speech and provides for additional penalties of up to $10,000 in 
addition to attorneys’ fees and costs). 
144. See, e.g., Gwire v. Blumberg, No. CGC11510305, 2013 WL 5493399, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Oct. 3, 2013) (describing issues relating to an attorney’s claim against his former clients, 
including four causes of action). 
145. Id. 
146. See id. at *1–2 (relating how the plaintiff (Gwire) had filed suit against the defendant 
(Blumberg), because Blumberg posted negative comments about him on the Internet). 
147. Id. at *2. 
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against people he believes have hurt him.”  Gwire claimed Blumberg had a 
pattern of blaming others “for his failures.”  According to Gwire, Blumberg 
had “completely lost not one, but two fortunes entrusted to him . . . in his 
attempt to be a hotshot hedge fund manager[.]”  Gwire also stated 
Blumberg’s “wife has divorced him and their divorce file is replete with 
episodes of unstable behavior by him.”  Finally, Gwire accused Blumberg of 
“lashing out.”148  
Gwire has sued his former client, Blumberg, for defamation and trade 
libel.149  Blumberg moved to dismiss the lawsuit under California’s Anti-
SLAPP statute, which the trial court granted in part but denied as to the 
defamation claims, because the trial court found that Gwire had met his 
burden of proving that he will probably prevail on his claims.150  The 
court of appeals affirmed this holding.151  The appropriateness of Gwire’s 
response to the online review, however, was not raised as an issue in the 
court of appeals’ decision and it is difficult to analyze from the facts in the 
decision whether any of the statements would be considered confidential 
information under California law.152  This case does, however, illustrate 
how all of the foregoing legal issues can arise in a dispute between a lawyer 
and a former client. 
IV.     SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITH CLIENTS 
As illustrated above, sometimes the relationship between a lawyer and a 
client ends poorly and may result in a variety of claims including a lawyer’s 
breach of contract claim against a client who does not pay the lawyer’s 
legal fees or a client’s malpractice claim against the lawyer.  Any disputes 
arising between a client and a lawyer may end in threatened litigation or 
the actual commencement of an action.  As with most disputes in the legal 
system, these disputes will probably result in a settlement.153  This raises 
the last question that this Article will explore: Can a confidentiality and 
 
148. Id. at *3 n.3. 
149. See id. at *1 (stating that after the defendant posted defamatory statements online, the 
plaintiff sued his former clients). 
150. See id. at *3–4 (noting that the court dismissed as to a portion of the plaintiff’s claim, but 
holding that he could nonetheless prove defamation as to some of the defendant’s statements (citing 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16)). 
151. See id. at *13 (agreeing with the previous court to affirm the holding (citing CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 425.16)). 
152. See generally id. at *3–4 (noting that after the plaintiff threatened to sue the defendant for 
his online posting, the defendant revised his subsequent online statements). 
153. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of 
Settlements, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339–40 (1994) (explaining the high rate of settlements of civil 
cases in the United States). 
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non-disparagement provision in a settlement agreement between a lawyer 
and a client be drafted in a manner that would prevent the client from 
posting negative online reviews about a lawyer as a term of the settlement? 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(h)(2) prohibits a lawyer from settling “a claim or 
potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former 
client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking 
and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent 
legal counsel in connection therewith.”154  As the comments to Model 
Rule 1.8 explain, there is a “danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage 
of an unrepresented client or former client,” which is why they must be 
advised of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent counsel.155  
As long as the lawyer complies with this rule, there is nothing that 
prohibits a lawyer from settling a malpractice or other dispute with a 
client.156 
A settlement agreement is, of course, a contract between private parties 
that will be enforced subject to the defenses available under contract 
law.157  If a settlement agreement contained a confidentiality provision 
that prohibited a former client from posting negative online reviews, a 
former client subject to such a provision could contend that agreement 
violates public policy and is unenforceable.158  The arguments here are 
similar to those raised in Section II with respect to non-disclosure 
agreements at the onset of the attorney–client relationship, but there are 
some differences with a confidentiality provision in a settlement agreement 
that could warrant a different treatment by the courts. 
One key difference that may weigh in favor of enforcing a 
confidentiality agreement in a settlement agreement is Model Rule 1.8’s 
requirement that the client be advised of obtaining independent counsel 
and the likelihood that the client will have independent counsel.159  
Unlike the inception of the attorney–client relationship—which is based 
 
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(2) (2013). 
155. Id. R. 1.8(h)(2), cmt. 15. 
156. See id. (“Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not 
prohibited by this Rule.”). 
157. See Sam McGee, Consequences of the Confidentiality Clause, 45 TRIAL, Jun. 2009, at 20, 21 
(“[A] party who seeks to avoid a confidentiality agreement has to do so based on the principals of 
contract law by proving fraud, mutual mistake, or other applicable defenses.”). 
158. See Steven G. Mehta, Lasting Agreement, LOS ANGELES LAW., Sept. 2007, at 28, 28 (“A 
court will not enforce a settlement agreement provision that is illegal, contrary to public policy, or 
unjust.” (citing Cal. State Auto Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 658, 664 
(1990); Timney v. Lin, 106 Cal. App 4th 1121, 1127 (Ct. App. 2003))). 
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2013) (stating that an attorney must 
notify the client in writing in order to seek independent counsel for advice). 
6 RIGERTAS_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:12 AM 
274 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:242 
on establishing trust, loyalty and the creation of a fiduciary relationship—
the settlement of a dispute with a lawyer occurs at a time when all of those 
principles have eroded.160  The lawyer is no longer in the position of 
being a fiduciary who must put the client’s interests first.  Therefore, from 
a client-centered perspective, enforcing a confidentiality provision that the 
lawyer and client agreed to after the deterioration of the attorney–client 
relationship does not raise the same issues as a similar agreement made at 
the time that the lawyer and client are creating the foundation of their 
relationship. 
Another difference that may favor enforcing a confidentiality clause in a 
settlement agreement is a general policy favoring the settlement of 
disputes.  
Courts have said that “honoring the parties’ express wish for confidentiality 
may facilitate settlement, which courts are bound to encourage,” and that 
“settlement agreements are highly favored in the law and will be upheld 
whenever possible because they are a means of amicably resolving doubts and 
uncertainties and preventing lawsuits.”161  
Courts have cited this policy when enforcing confidentiality agreements 
even when they restrict a party’s right to speak on matters of public 
concern.162 
However, another key difference here weighs against enforcing a 
confidentiality agreement in a settlement agreement.  As discussed in 
Section II regarding non-disclosure agreements at the inception of the 
attorney–client relationship, a confidentiality agreement that prohibited a 
client from reporting misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary authority 
would violate public policy and be unenforceable.163  The rationale for 
not enforcing such a restriction is based on the need that disciplinary 
authorities have in discovering attorney misconduct and imposing the 
discipline necessary to protect the public from attorneys who have engaged 
 
160. See Jennifer L. Myers, David Sonenshein & David N. Hofstein, To Regulate or Not to 
Regulate Attorney–Client Sex? The Ethical Question, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 741, 786–87 (1996) 
(determining that an attorney has a fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith, a duty of care, and a 
confidentiality duty when handling the client’s information). 
161. Sam McGee, Consequences of the Confidentiality Clause, 45 TRIAL, Jun. 2009, at 20, 21  
(quoting Gamble v. Deutsche Bank, AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. 
Loflin, 440 F.2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 2005)). 
162. See id. (describing how courts favor settlements and enforce confidentiality agreements). 
163. See, e.g., In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 794 (Ill. 1988) (holding that an attorney has a 
duty to protect the client’s information unless the client discloses this information to the attorney in 
the presence of a third party); see also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (2010) 
(prohibiting lawyers in Illinois from entering into any contract with a client that limits the client’s 
right to pursue any complaint with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission). 
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in professional misconduct.164 
This public protection rationale could logically extend to a policy that 
favors the freedom of disgruntled former clients to be able to provide an 
account of their experience to other consumers who might find that 
information useful when deciding which lawyer to hire.165  Some attorney 
conduct may not warrant discipline, but it can still be relevant to others 
who are considering hiring a lawyer.  The public has a legitimate interest in 
obtaining information about lawyers who hold the privilege of a law 
license and who may be handling their important legal matters.166  This 
rationale may have more force in agreements that settled a client’s claim 
for malpractice than in agreements that settled other disputes, such as a 
client’s refusal to pay a fee owed. 
There are some areas where courts and legislatures have decided that 
confidentiality agreements should not be enforced as a matter of public 
policy.  For example, The Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act167 prohibits 
agreements that conceal public hazards or the resolution of claims against 
state or municipal entities.168  Similarly, the California legislature has 
indicated that it disfavors confidential settlement agreements in civil suits 
that involve elder abuse.169  The Eleventh Circuit has also taken this 
approach with settlements of cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act170 
because confidentiality would contravene Congress’s intent and undermine 
regulatory efforts.171  These examples reflect the policy concerns about 
concealing certain information, which has also been described as follows:  
 
164. See Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 795–96 (discussing how the court decides the proper 
punishment for the disciplined attorney in light of protecting the public from such conduct). 
165. See Ronald L. Burdge, Bad for Clients, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements Is Bad for 
Lawyers, Bad for Justice, GP SOLO, Nov./Dec. 2012, at 25, 25–26 (arguing that no settlement 
agreements should be confidential because the legal system belongs to the public and the public has a 
right to know the resolution of disputes whether that occurs at trial or in a settlement agreement). 
166. See Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 795–96 (illustrating how sanctioning an attorney safeguards 
the public (citing In re LaPinska, 72 Ill.2d 461, 473 (1978))). 
167. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2004). 
168. See Jennifer Snyder Heis, Confidentiality of Settlement Agreements, FOR THE DEFENSE, 
Feb. 2007, at 35, 35–36 (explaining how Florida finds settlement contracts unenforceable when they 
hide public hazards or claims against the state or municipalities because these agreements are against 
public policy (citing FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2004))). 
169. See Steven G. Mehta, Lasting Agreement, LOS ANGELES LAW., Sept. 2007, at 28, 32–33 
(noting that the California legislature disfavors confidential settlement agreements involving elder 
abuse (citing CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2017.310(a))). 
170. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. III 2010). 
171. See Ronald L. Burdge, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements Is Bad for Clients, Bad for 
Lawyers, Bad for Justice, GP SOLO, Nov./Dec. 2012, at 24, 26 (illustrating an example where 
confidentiality should not be enforced because it violates the intention of the legislature). 
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  Confidentiality prevents the public from knowing about systemic 
wrongful conduct.  It can also prevent regulators and government agencies 
from performing their duty to enforce the law and protect the public. . . .  
When violations are hidden by confidentiality, the legal system itself is 
thwarted from fulfilling one of its fundamental purposes: to protect the 
citizenry from wrongful conduct.172  
These concerns may weigh against enforcement of confidentiality or 
non-disparagement agreements between lawyers and former clients as a 
matter of public policy. 
V.     CONCLUSION 
As consumers create and review more online reviews as part of their 
decision-making process about which lawyer to hire, lawyers will have a 
variety of issues arise regarding their online professional reputation.  
Lawyers may consider a variety of ways to control or repair their 
reputations, but they should be aware of a variety of ethical pitfalls that 
they may encounter.  The upside of the expansion of online reviews is that 
many consumers may be able to access information about lawyers that was 
previously elusive—such as communication skills, empathy, diligence, 
price, etc.—and could inform their decision-making. 
There is, however, a risk that consumers will get information that is not 
helpful because it is false or too one-sided.  There is little oversight of 
consumer reviews and anonymous reviews mean that some reviews might 
not even be written by actual clients.  As the regulators of the legal 
profession, the state supreme courts may want to consider taking up the 
role of providing a reliable, non-commercial location for clients to review 
their experiences with lawyers.173  Like sites such as Angie’s List, the 







172. Id. at 25. 
173. See Lucille M. Ponte, Mad Med Posing as Ordinary Consumers: The Essential Role of Self-
Regulation and Industry Ethics on Decreasing Deceptive Online Consumer Ratings and Reviews, 12 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 462, 502–03 (2013) (suggesting that professions collaborate with 
“independent third-party review organizations to police their professions and provide easy to 
understand rankings of fellow professionals”). 
174. See ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/how-it-works.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 
2014) (describing that the site does not allow anonymous reviews). 
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